We show that there is a direct relation between the maximum length of the keys extracted from biometric data and the error rates of the biometric system. The length of the bio-key depends on the amount of information that can be extracted from the source data. This information can be used a-priori to evaluate the potential of the biometric data in the context of a specific cryptographic application. We model the biometric data more naturally as a continuous distribution and we give a new definition for fuzzy extractors that works better for this type of data.
INTRODUCTION
Databases with biometric information are a serious threat to the privacy of users. The ability to track users across multiple databases is an example of this threat. The usual solution of using different passwords in different systems does not apply for obvious reasons -a person only has a limited number of biometric identification available: ten fingers, two eyes, etc. If one of these is compromised nothing can be done to undo the harm. Template protection can be used to store securely a biometric identity of a user. Tracking is no longer possible if different template protection schemes are used in different databases. If by some means a database with protected templates is compromised, the attacker cannot learn significant information about the biometric data. Moreover, if such an intrusion is detected, the biometric is not lost, since at any time the protection scheme can be reapplied on the original data. As one needs measurements to obtain biometric data, another inherent problem with biometrics is noise. One cannot use biometric data directly as a password (or key), since classical cryptography cannot cope with the noisiness of the biometric data. Uniform and reproducible randomness is the main ingredient for a good password. Unfortunately, biometric measurements do not fit this directly. Template protection schemes can be applied as a transformation function on biometric data to make the password reproducible. By this transformation, biometrics can be used as passwords. In the literature often the source of biometric data is considered to be either continuous, shielding functions [6] , the reliable component scheme [9] and the multi-bit scheme [4] or discrete like fuzzy vault [10] and the secure sketch [5] . It is difficult to compare the performance of these schemes because there is no common view on the evaluation strategy. Authors estimate the performance of their biometric system in terms of FAR and FRR , but when it comes to evaluating the security of the resulting binary sequence different authors have different opinions. Monrose et al. [7] compute the guessing entropy while Zhang et al. [11] try to estimate the number of effective bits in the resulting key and propose a weighting system for choosing the best combination. Chang et al. [4] analyze the security of a sketch by investigating the remaining entropy of the biometric data, given that the sketch is made public. The same approach is taken by [2] . Contribution. Fuzzy extractors [5] where proposed as a general model capable of describing any template protection scheme that assumes a discrete source initial data. In this paper we extend the scope of the classical fuzzy extractors to continuous source data. We propose CS-fuzzy extractors as a general model for template protection schemes. We show that the length and the quality of the bio-key depends on the amount of distinguishing information that can be extracted from the initial data. This gives a bound on the number of uniformly distributed bits that can be extracted from a given set of data. This information can be used a-priori to evaluate the potential of the biometric data in the context of a specific cryptographic application.
PRELIMINARIES
Before we delve into the differences between discrete and continuous source biometrics, we need to establish some background first. We start by giving our notations, as well as some basic definitions. Secondly, we introduce the fuzzy extractor for a discrete source as given by [2, 5] . Thirdly, we briefly discuss the chosen model of the continuous source and its implications. Lastly, we remind the reader of the definitions of biometric error rates common in the literature. Notation and Definitions. We will use U l to denote the set of uniformly distributed binary sequences of length l. When referring to keys extracted from biometric data we are interested in the probability that an adversary can guess the value of the key on the first try. The min-entropy or the predictability of a random variable X denoted by H ∞ (X) is defined as the logarithm of the most probable element in the distribution:
The min-entropy tells us the number of nearly uniform bits that can be extracted from the variable X. The Kolmogorov distance or statistical distance between two probability distributions A and B is defined as:
For modelling the process of randomness extraction from fuzzy data Dodis et al. [5] define the notion of a fuzzy extractor. The purpose of a fuzzy extractor is to extract robustly a binary sequence s from a noisy measurement w with the help of some public string Q. Enrollment is performed by a function Gen, that on input of Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. the noise free biometric w and the binary string s, will compute a public string Q. During authentication, function Reg takes as input a noisy measurement w and the public string Q and it will output the binary string s if w and w come from the same user. For a discrete source M endowed with a metric d, the formal definition of a fuzzy extractor [2, 5] Distribution modelling. The biometric identity of a user is described by multiple features. We assume that the features are independent. For simplicity, we consider a single feature. Let S a (the subscript a meaning authentic) be the probability distribution that describes a user in the system. We denote with Sg the probability distribution of the whole population, the subscript means global. Therefor,
represents the probability density function of the global distribution and the user distribution, respectively. Error rates. The error rates of a biometric system are determined by the accuracy with which the matching engine can determine the similarity between a measured sample w and the expected value w of distribution Sa [1] . We can construct two hypotheses:
[H0] the measured w is coming from the authentic user; [H 1 ] the measured w is not coming from the authentic user; The matching engine has to decide whether H 0 or H 1 is true. To express the accuracy of a biometric system the terms false acceptance rate, FAR and false rejection rate, FRR are used. The false acceptance rate is a Type I error and represents the probability that H 0 will be accepted when in fact H 1 is true. The false rejection rate is a Type II error and represents the probability that the outcome of the matching engine is H 1 but H 0 is true. In the setting of figure 1 we have a false acceptance every time another user, from the distribution Sg is generating a measurement which is in the acceptance region described by the interval T 1 , T 2 . We can then write FAR =
). Every time user S a produces a sample that is in the rejection area, he will be rejected, thus
. Dodis et al. [5] assume that the data source M is discrete for the definition of fuzzy extractor. However, the class of template protection schemes that uses continuous sources does not fit this model. The subject of next section is the extension of fuzzy extractor definition to continuous source fuzzy extractors.
FUZZY EXTRACTORS FOR CONTINU-OUS DISTRIBUTIONS
We show in this section that in the fuzzy extractor (M, m, l, t, ) there is a natural link between parameter m, the threshold t, the length of the resulting binary sequence l and the distance between the distribution of the key and the uniform distribution. For the csfuzzy extractors we choose slightly different parameters which are more natural for biometric data.
From continuous to discrete sources
Definition 1 relies on a source M with min-entropy m. How can we construct a source with min-entropy m out of a continuous distribution S g ? A common solution is to divide the measurement axis into intervals. To each interval d i a discrete string s i will be associated.
Example. In the setting of figure 1 the result of this division is the discrete distribution Dg = di , i = 1..n. In figure 1 , n is equal to 8. The public string Q contains the representation of the quantization. The probability of selecting an interval is computed as
where the integral is taken over the interval di. The continuous distribution Sg has been transformed into the discrete distribution Dg = di , i = 1, . . . , n where n=8. A user S a can be described by only one authentic interval. We chose the authentic interval d i for which the value p auth = R d i p a (x)dx is maximized. In figure 1, d 7 best describes user Sa. Now we are able to speak of the min-entropy of Dg denoted by m and defined as m = − log 2 pmax where
The effective key space size of a biometric was already linked to p auth in [8] . 
Relating min-entropy m and FAR
The above construction using the biometric data creates a tight relation between the min-entropy m of distribution D g and the error rates of the biometric system. For the output sequence s to have a small chance of guessing the correct value from the first try we have to maximize the min-entropy by lowering the values of all the probabilities p i . Unfortunately, by lowering p i we increase the FRR . PROPOSITION 1. For the above defined distribution Dg we have m ≤ − log 2 FAR with equality when p auth = p max .
CORROLARY 1. FAR ≤ 2
−m with equality when p auth = pmax.
Parameters t and FRR
According to definition 1 the Reg[w , Q] procedure will output the same binary sequence s as Gen[w] whenever w and w are close. This means that w and w probably belong to the same user. In definition 1 this is written as d(w, w ) < t, where d is some metric, for example the Euclidian distance or the set difference metric. The value of t, does not say anything about the acceptance or the rejection probability of a user which, we feel, is more relevant. Also a suitable metric is not always available in the case of continuous sources. The probability of correctly identifying that two measurements belong to the same user is the opposite of a Type II error, thus the detection probability P d = 1−FRR is a suitable generalization of the threshold t.
Relating min-entropy and l to
We show in this section that given the number of bits l that we want to extract, and the min-entropy, m = H ∞ (D g ) for a feature we can estimate , the distance of the output sequence distribution to the uniform distribution given the helper data Q as follows:
Looking at the last term, since the uniform distribution is independent of the helper data, we can write P (s ∈ U l |Q ∈ Q) = P (s ∈ U l ) = 2 −l . Introducing the notation P (s|Q) := P (s ∈ S|Q ∈ Q), this gives = sup s P (s|Q) − 2 −l . Splitting this relation into two cases, we get sup
, with equality when there exists a key sequence that is never attained. If we compare the two cases, we see that the first case represents the value of if
To conclude, this shows that can be bounded from above in terms of the min-entropy m and l as follows:
CS-fuzzy extractors
The above relations lead us to the following definition of the fuzzy extractors for continuous sources. 
Reg is a regeneration function that given a measurement u sampled from Sa and a public string Q outputs a string s ∈ {0, 1} l , s = Reg[u , Q], where s,Q ← Gen[S a ], with probability equal to the detection probability,
Cs-fuzzy extractors preserve the mechanism of the generate and regenerate functions as proposed in the original fuzzy extractors definition. The link between the used parameters in each model was described in the preceding sections, thus any fuzzy extractor is also a cs-fuzzy extractor. However, cs-fuzzy extractors are better suited to handle continuous source biometric data. In [3] we take three template protection examples for continuous source data from the literature and show that they can be fitted in this model.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Fuzzy extractors are a theoretical tool for modelling and comparing template protection schemes which use a discrete source. We generalize the definition to cs-fuzzy extractors, which can also handle the continuous source cases. Our model can cope with both classes of template protection schemes. Biometric authentication systems are evaluated using the false acceptance rate and the false rejection rate. The link between the two was hitherto not obvious even though they refer to the same data. In this paper we show, that there is a natural connection between the false acceptance rate, false rejection rate and the parameters used to evaluate a template protection scheme implemented on the same data. We also show that the error rates have a direct influence on the length and robustness of the key extracted from the features of a user. In this paper we only consider the one dimensional case. However, biometric data contains multiple features for each user. As future work we want to investigate the influence of various feature aggregation methods on the length and robustness of the key.
